CROSSWALKS

GAISSF to CRO 021 Crosswalk

Public crosswalk publication mapping GAISSF v1.0 to CRO 021, with scope, method, limitations and traceability.

GAISSF™ v1.0

ISO/IEC 23894 MAPPING - EXECUTIVE BRIEF

Risk alignment, evidence reuse and assurance implications

Version 1.2 | Final Source-Bounded Publication

Methodology Note

This brief summarizes the coordinated CRO-021 Technical Report. ISO/IEC 23894:2023 document identity and structure were confirmed from official metadata and an authorized preview. Detailed mappings are analytical and require revalidation when licensed full text becomes available. ISO/IEC 23894 is guidance, not a certifiable requirements standard.

Executive Decision

Adopt ISO/IEC 23894-aligned risk documentation as the common governance layer, but do not substitute it for GAISSF technical validation. Risk records explain why a treatment was selected; GAISSF VTS evidence demonstrates whether the treatment operates effectively.

Decision Boundaries

Permitted useNot supported
Risk alignment, treatment traceability, evidence reuse planning and gap analysisClaims of ISO certification, GAISSF equivalence or automatic audit acceptance
Reuse of qualified risk registers, approvals, consultation and monitoring recordsReplacing runtime, agentic, privacy or physical-AI testing with policy documents
Source-bounded clause and lifecycle mappingClaiming full-text verification without the licensed ISO standard

1. Evidence Reuse and Assurance Boundary

Evidence that can be reused

  • AI risk policy, scope, context and risk criteria.
  • Risk registers, scenario analysis, treatment plans and residual-risk approvals.
  • Roles, consultation records, monitoring results and management reporting.
  • Lifecycle and change-review records that remain current and within the same assessment boundary.

Evidence that still requires GAISSF validation

  • Runtime adversarial, prompt-injection, jailbreak and tool-abuse testing.
  • Model-integrity, provenance, drift, extraction and cryptographic testing.
  • Agent authority, memory, inter-agent trust and exfiltration safeguards.
  • Content-safety, privacy, supply-chain and regulatory evidence checks.
  • Physical-AI HIL or certified-simulator tests and signed evidence.

Acceptance test for reused evidence

QuestionRequired answer
Same scope?System, model, data, environment, supplier and intended use are materially equivalent.
Authentic and intact?Source, owner, date, integrity and chain of custody are verifiable.
Current?Evidence remains within its review period and no trigger has invalidated it.
Sufficient?Evidence demonstrates the claimed process or outcome, with limitations recorded.
Effective?Where operating effectiveness is claimed, VTS or equivalent independent evidence exists.

2. Coverage and Lifecycle Implications

The mapping covers all 59 GAISSF controls. Governance and regulatory controls align most strongly with ISO/IEC 23894 risk processes; technical runtime, agentic and physical controls retain the largest validation gap.

DomainPrimary lifecycle relevanceExecutive implication
D1Data, training, validation, monitoringRisk records support treatment; VTS proves model integrity.
D2Validation, deployment, operationRe-test after prompt, tool, model or interface change.
D3Design, integration, operation, retirementAuthority and memory boundaries require technical evidence.
D4Acquisition, integration, supplier monitoringSupplier evidence is version- and context-dependent.
D5Data, design, validation, user interactionEvaluation datasets and policy assumptions must be controlled.
D6All stagesStrong governance alignment; operating effectiveness remains testable.
D7Impact assessment, deployment, incident responseStakeholder and threat assumptions require periodic refresh.
D8All stagesLegal and regulatory evidence requires annual/event-driven review.
D9Physical integration, HIL validation, operationMock CI output is not physical certification evidence.

Notably absent from risk guidance alone

  • Attack corpora and technical thresholds.
  • Agent memory isolation and least-agency enforcement.
  • Content, privacy and watermark robustness criteria.
  • Actuator interlocks, safe-state timing and emergency-stop latency.
  • Universal acceptable-risk, fairness, safety or legal-compliance thresholds.

3. Financial and Governance Framing

Evidence-Reuse Economics

Use a transparent planning formula rather than a generic savings claim:

Estimated Audit Efficiency Gain = (hours of redundant risk documentation avoided × blended hourly rate) - incremental GAISSF VTS execution cost.

Illustrative planning example only: 80 avoided hours × $120/hour - $4,000 VTS execution = $5,600 estimated net efficiency gain. Confidence range: ±15%. Actual results depend on evidence quality, scope overlap, assessor acceptance, automation and test complexity.

Governance controls

  • Approve reuse only after scope, authenticity, currency, completeness and effectiveness checks.
  • Maintain one risk-to-control-to-VTS traceability chain.
  • Assign owners for treatment, residual-risk approval and revalidation.
  • Treat demo or mock HIL output as engineering evidence only.
  • Record expiry dates and trigger-based review conditions for reused evidence.

Incident response maturity

D6-CTL-04 retains its normative tabletop/readiness validation. More mature organizations may add an automated playbook profile for detection, containment, rollback, evidence capture and escalation. This is supplementary assurance and does not create a new GAISSF control.

4. Risks, Review Triggers and Recommended Action

Primary limitations

  • The mapping is not full-text verified against a licensed ISO/IEC 23894 copy.
  • Alignment does not establish certification, conformity, legal compliance or technical effectiveness.
  • ISO risk guidance does not define GAISSF pass criteria or universal acceptable-risk thresholds.
  • System, threat, regulatory or source changes can invalidate earlier evidence-reuse decisions.

Mandatory review triggers

TriggerExamples
AnnualScheduled source, scope, evidence and residual-risk review.
System changeNew model, fine-tuning, tool, agent authority, supplier, hardware or environment.
Threat changeNew vulnerability, attack technique, harm scenario or near miss.
Regulatory changeNew law, guidance, enforcement position, jurisdiction or sector.
Source changeRevision to ISO/IEC 23894, GAISSF, schema or VTS.
FailureIncident, audit finding, exercise failure or VTS failure.

Full technical mapping — GAISSF to ISO/IEC 23894

The summary above is the Executive Brief companion. The complete source-bounded technical mapping — methodology, evidence-tier model, the full 59-control mapping register, reverse process index and practitioner annexes — follows in full below.

Executive Summary

CRO-021 maps the 59-control GAISSF v1.0 baseline to the publicly verifiable structure of ISO/IEC 23894:2023. It supports risk-register integration, evidence reuse and treatment traceability while preserving a strict distinction between risk-management process evidence and technical control-effectiveness evidence.

This edition is source-bounded. The clause structure is confirmed from official and authorized sources; detailed semantic alignments are ODA3 analytical inferences pending access to the complete licensed standard. The mapping therefore does not claim full-text verification, conformity, certification or equivalence.

Measure Result
GAISSF controls mapped 59
Strong partial 13
Partial 5
Supporting 41
Medium-High confidence 13
Medium confidence 46

1. Purpose and Intended Use

This report provides a controlled crosswalk for aligning GAISSF control implementation with AI risk-management activities, reusing qualified risk evidence, identifying residual technical validation and planning future full-text re-verification.

2. Source Boundary and Authority

The external source baseline is ISO/IEC 23894:2023. The exact external sources used are the ISO official standard record and abstract, together with the ANSI-authorized five-page preview. The complete licensed text was not available. GAISSF-NOR-001, GAISSF-NOR-004, the GAISSF evidence schema and the actual GAISSF VTS v1.0.1 release package are the primary controlled GAISSF sources.

3. Evidence-Tier Model

The report uses inline evidence-tier tags in Sections 4-8 so readers can distinguish controlled evidence from source-bounded inference and recommendations.

Tier Meaning
T1 Primary controlled evidence: GAISSF normative documents, schema and actual VTS v1.0.1 release files.
T2 Authorized external structural evidence: ISO official metadata/abstract and ANSI-authorized preview.
T3 ODA3 analytical inference: source-bounded mapping, rating and gap analysis.
T4 Implementation recommendation or illustrative practice, not an ISO requirement.

4. Mapping Methodology

[T1] GAISSF control identifiers, titles, VTS identifiers, test paths, test designs, pass criteria and evidence artifacts were derived from the controlled GAISSF v1.0 normative and VTS release materials.

[T2] The ISO/IEC 23894 document identity, clause hierarchy and annex headings were confirmed using the ISO official record and the ANSI-authorized five-page preview.

[T3] Each semantic mapping compares risk objective, scope, affected lifecycle stage, evidence, treatment and review purpose. Keyword similarity alone is not treated as alignment.

[T3] Relationship ratings are Strong partial, Partial, Supporting or Contextual. No rating means equivalence, conformity, certification or automatic evidence acceptance.

[T4] Every record includes a re-validation trigger and an ODA3-derived risk extension to operationalize GAISSF evidence needs without presenting those fields as ISO requirements.

5. Why the ODA3-Derived Risk Extension Is Necessary

[T2] ISO/IEC 23894 provides risk-management guidance and a process structure for identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and recording AI risk.

[T3] GAISSF additionally requires control-specific, testable and auditable technical outcomes. The ODA3-derived extension therefore specifies the data fields needed to connect a risk-treatment decision to a GAISSF control, its VTS, its acceptance criteria and its signed evidence.

[T4] In practical terms: the ISO-aligned process establishes that a treatment plan should exist; the ODA3 extension records the system boundary, scenario, stakeholder, owner, treatment, measurable acceptance criterion, VTS evidence, residual risk and review trigger needed for GAISSF assurance.

6. Evidence Reuse and Validation Rules

[T1] Reusable GAISSF evidence must remain relevant, authentic, traceable, complete, current and linked to the assessed scope. Certification-grade evidence must demonstrate implementation and operating effectiveness, not policy intent alone.

[T3] ISO-aligned risk registers, treatment plans, approvals, consultation records, monitoring results and review records can be reused only after scope, authenticity, currency, completeness and effectiveness qualification.

[T1] The exact VTS package path is recorded as oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/...; the shorter tests/... path remains the repository-relative test location. Demo or mock HIL output is not certification evidence.

[T4] For D6-CTL-04, organizations may add a supplementary automated incident-response validation profile for detection, containment, rollback, evidence capture and escalation. This is a recommended extension, not a new GAISSF control.

7. Relationship and Confidence Interpretation

[T3] Governance and regulatory controls generally receive Strong partial / Medium-High ratings because ISO/IEC 23894 structurally addresses governance, ownership, assessment, treatment, monitoring and reporting, while GAISSF adds precise technical mechanisms and test evidence.

[T3] Runtime, adversarial, agentic and physical-AI controls generally receive Supporting / Medium ratings because risk-management guidance can justify and monitor treatment but does not define attack corpora, technical thresholds, memory isolation, actuator interlocks or HIL pass criteria.

[T3] Shadow AI receives stronger alignment where discovery, ownership, context, treatment and monitoring form the primary control outcome, but GAISSF still requires explicit discovery coverage and evidence.

8. Coverage Summary and Lifecycle View

[T3] The complete 59-control register is placed in Annex B to preserve the narrative flow of the Technical Report. Annex C provides the reverse ISO-process index.

Domain Domain title Controls Relationship profile Primary lifecycle stages
D1 Model Integrity & Adversarial Robustness 9 Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 9 Data collection, processing and labelling; modelling and training; verification and validation; operation and monitoring.
D2 Runtime Security & Adversarial Defense 6 Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 6 Verification and validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; incident response and change management.
D3 Agentic Risk & Autonomous System Security 7 Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 7 System design; integration; deployment; operation and monitoring; change, transfer and decommissioning.
D4 Supply Chain & Third-Party AI Security 7 Strong partial 1; Partial 0; Supporting 6 Acquisition and sourcing; system integration; deployment; supplier monitoring; change and retirement.
D5 Content Safety & Output Integrity 6 Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 6 Data preparation; design and development; verification and validation; deployment; operation and user interaction.
D6 Governance, Accountability & Human Oversight 7 Strong partial 7; Partial 0; Supporting 0 All lifecycle stages, with emphasis on governance, approval gates, monitoring, incident response and retirement.
D7 Human & Societal Harms 5 Strong partial 0; Partial 5; Supporting 0 Design and impact assessment; verification and validation; deployment; operation; stakeholder communication and incident response.
D8 Regulatory Alignment & Compliance 5 Strong partial 5; Partial 0; Supporting 0 All lifecycle stages through legal, regulatory and assurance checkpoints, with periodic re-evaluation.
D9 Physical AI Safety 7 Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 7 System design; physical integration; HIL validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; emergency response and decommissioning.

9. Operational Use Model

  • Use the risk register to identify the AI asset, scenario, affected stakeholders, uncertainty, likelihood, consequence and owner.

  • Link each selected treatment to the relevant GAISSF control and VTS record.

  • Qualify existing evidence before reuse and record any scope or freshness limitation.

  • Execute the VTS or an independently equivalent test where process evidence does not demonstrate the technical outcome.

  • Record residual risk, acceptance authority, expiry and review trigger.

  • Revalidate at least annually and whenever the control-specific trigger in Annex B occurs.

10. Regulatory and Standards Evolution

Regulatory and standards references evolve. D8 evidence and mappings shall be reviewed at least annually and whenever authoritative legislation, regulatory guidance, enforcement practice, ISO publications or GAISSF controlled sources change. A revision that materially affects scope, interpretation, evidence or technical validation shall trigger controlled downstream impact analysis.

11. Notably Absent from ISO/IEC 23894 Risk Guidance

The following capabilities are not demonstrated merely by following a risk-management process and remain subject to GAISSF-specific implementation and VTS evidence:

  • Runtime adversarial-defense thresholds for prompt injection, jailbreaks, multimodal attacks, tool-call abuse and cross-context hijacking.

  • Model-integrity pass criteria for poisoning, extraction, drift, federated learning, embeddings, adapters, merges, quantization and cryptographic hardening.

  • Agentic enforcement mechanisms for least agency, inter-agent trust, chained prompts, memory isolation, exfiltration prevention and secure memory lifecycle.

  • Control-specific supply-chain test procedures for AI BOMs, model scanning, registry vetting, MCP behavior, external APIs, shadow AI and dependency analysis.

  • Content-safety and privacy evaluation thresholds for harmful content, PII leakage, copyright, watermarking and privacy-preserving ML.

  • Control-specific operating-effectiveness evidence for human intervention, audit trails, model cards, incident readiness, decommissioning, vendor governance and resilience.

  • Physical-AI HIL pass criteria for harm boundaries, safe states, emergency stops, cyber-physical detection, sensor integrity, actuator commands and incident evidence preservation.

  • Universal legal compliance, sector approval, fairness, safety or acceptable residual-risk thresholds.

12. Publication, Claims and Change-Control Rules

  • Publish CRO-021 as informative, source-bounded and version-controlled.

  • Do not claim full-text verification until a licensed ISO/IEC 23894:2023 copy has been reviewed.

  • Do not describe ISO/IEC 23894 as a certifiable requirements standard or claim that alignment demonstrates certification.

  • Do not redistribute protected ISO/IEC text or the preview.

  • Publish the Technical Report, Executive Brief, XLSX register, JSON register, version history and checksum manifest as one coordinated package.

  • Record every mapping, source, VTS, schema or claims change in version_history.md.

Annex A - Register Field Definitions

Field Definition
vts_test_file Repository-relative path inside the VTS release.
vts_package_path Exact path inside the supplied oda3-gaissf-vts release package.
vts_test_design High-level validation action.
vts_pass_criteria Measurable conditions required for the VTS result.
vts_evidence_artifacts Evidence object or artifact produced by successful execution.
relationship_justification Why the selected relationship rating applies.
revalidation_trigger Events requiring reassessment of the mapping and evidence.
primary_ai_lifecycle_stage Primary ISO/IEC 23894 Annex C lifecycle relevance.
source_tier_basis Evidence tiers supporting the mapping.
context_adaptation_note Context-specific tailoring note where the reference VTS cannot be universal.
supplementary_validation_profile Optional additional assurance activity that does not create a new normative control.

Annex B - 59-Control Mapping Register

Controlled Publication. The table below shows a representative sample (6 of 59 total records). The complete control-by-control mapping register — full requirement-level traceability, evidence guidance and machine-readable export — is a Controlled Publication. Contact ODA3 Institute for access.
ID / Title ISO/IEC 23894 anchors Rating / rationale VTS design / criteria Evidence artifacts Risk extension / re-validation trigger
D1-CTL-01
Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-01-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_dataset_provenance.py
Design: Provide dataset metadata with hash and source; execute poisoning detection scan against GAISSF™ Benchmark Dataset (Category: Data Poisoning) (open-source options: Giskard, CleanLab)
Pass: hash_verified = True; source_in_allowlist = True; poisoning_score = 0; test_coverage >= 1000 samples
JSON with hash, source, scan results, poisoning_score
Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding
D1-CTL-02
Model Extraction Resistance
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Model Extraction Resistance; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-02-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_model_extraction.py
Design: Execute 10,000 queries at maximum allowed rate against production inference endpoint using GAISSF™ Extraction Benchmark Suite
Pass: extraction_success_count < 10 (0.1% of queries); detection_alerts_triggered = True; rate_limiting_enforced = True
JSON with extraction_success_count, detection_alerts, rate_limit_logs
Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding
D1-CTL-03
Behavioral Drift Detection
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C; 5.6; 5.7.1; 5.7.2 Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Behavioral Drift Detection; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-03-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_behavioral_drift.py
Design: Monitor model predictions over 30-day period; calculate KL divergence against established baseline
Pass: max_kl_divergence < 0.05; accuracy_drop < 5% over 30 days; alert_generated_for_any_drift_event = True
JSON with daily_kl_divergence_values, accuracy_trend, alert_log
Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding
D1-CTL-04
Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-04-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_federated_poisoning.py
Design: Simulate malicious client submitting poisoned gradients in federated learning simulation environment
Pass: malicious_gradient_detection_rate >= 95%; poisoned_gradients_excluded_from_aggregation = True
JSON with detection_rate, aggregation_log, client_anomaly_scores
Retention: 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding
D1-CTL-05
Embedding Space Robustness
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Embedding Space Robustness; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-05-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_embedding_robustness.py
Design: Apply adversarial perturbations (FGM, PGD) to embedding inputs; measure classification change rate
Pass: classification_change_rate < 5% under bounded perturbation (epsilon=0.1); certified_radius_measured = True
JSON with classification_change_rate, certified_radius, attack_log
Retention: 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding
D1-CTL-06
Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C Supporting / Medium
ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific.
D1-CTL-06-VTS-001
oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_pqc_signing.py
Design: Attempt to verify model signature using RSA-2048 while quantum-safe algorithm is available; test TLS downgrade to pre-quantum cipher suite
Pass: legacy_rsa_signature_rejected = True; tls_downgrade_blocked = True; pqc_key_exchange_enabled = True
JSON with signature_verification_log, tls_cipher_suite_audit, pqc_migration_plan
Retention: 7 years (all tiers — long-term cryptographic assurance)
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS.
Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding

Annex C - Reverse ISO/IEC 23894 Process Index

Reference Topic Source-bounded explanation Mapped GAISSF controls
4 Principles of AI risk management Risk-management principles applied to AI-specific uncertainty, impacts and organizational objectives. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
5.1 Framework - General General design and operation of the risk-management framework. D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07
5.2 Leadership and commitment Leadership sponsorship and accountability for AI risk management. D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07
5.3 Integration Integration of AI risk management into governance, processes and decision-making. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
5.4.1 Understanding the organization and its context External/internal context, roles, objectives, constraints and stakeholders. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
5.4.2 Articulating risk-management commitment Policy, commitment and management direction. D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07
5.4.3 Roles, authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities Ownership and accountability for risk decisions and activities. D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07
5.4.4 Allocating resources People, competence, data, technology, time and funding for risk management. D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
5.4.5 Communication and consultation Internal and external communication and stakeholder consultation. D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-05, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-03
5.5 Implementation Operational implementation of the risk-management framework. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
5.6 Evaluation Evaluation of framework design, implementation and effectiveness. D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07
5.7.1 Adapting Adaptation to changes in context, systems, impacts and risk. D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-07, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07
5.7.2 Continually improving Continual improvement of the risk-management framework. D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-07, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07
6.1 Risk-management process - General Application of a structured and iterative risk-management process. No direct anchor
6.2 Communication and consultation Communication and consultation throughout the process. D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-05, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-03
6.3.2 Defining the scope Boundaries, assumptions, decisions, assets and lifecycle scope. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.3.3 External and internal context Context and stakeholder factors relevant to a specific assessment. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.3.4 Defining risk criteria Likelihood, consequence, acceptability, prioritization and decision criteria. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05
6.4.2 Risk identification Identification of threats, harms, events, causes, consequences and affected stakeholders. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.4.3 Risk analysis Analysis of likelihood, consequence, uncertainty, controls and residual risk. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.4.4 Risk evaluation Comparison against criteria and prioritization for treatment. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05
6.5.2 Selection of risk-treatment options Selection and justification of treatments, including avoidance, modification, sharing and acceptance. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.5.3 Preparing and implementing treatment plans Treatment plan, ownership, resources, schedule, acceptance criteria and residual-risk approval. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-06
6.6 Monitoring and review Monitoring assumptions, controls, indicators, incidents and changes. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
6.7 Recording and reporting Risk records, decisions, evidence, reporting and traceability. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
Annex A Objectives Examples of objectives that can be affected by AI risk. D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-03
Annex B Risk sources Illustrative AI risk sources for identification and analysis. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07
Annex C AI system lifecycle Application of risk management across AI lifecycle stages. D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07

Annex D - GAISSF Domain to AI Lifecycle Map

Domain Primary lifecycle stage alignment
D1 Data collection, processing and labelling; modelling and training; verification and validation; operation and monitoring.
D2 Verification and validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; incident response and change management.
D3 System design; integration; deployment; operation and monitoring; change, transfer and decommissioning.
D4 Acquisition and sourcing; system integration; deployment; supplier monitoring; change and retirement.
D5 Data preparation; design and development; verification and validation; deployment; operation and user interaction.
D6 All lifecycle stages, with emphasis on governance, approval gates, monitoring, incident response and retirement.
D7 Design and impact assessment; verification and validation; deployment; operation; stakeholder communication and incident response.
D8 All lifecycle stages through legal, regulatory and assurance checkpoints, with periodic re-evaluation.
D9 System design; physical integration; HIL validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; emergency response and decommissioning.

Annex E - Domain-Level Practitioner Interpretation

D1 - Model Integrity & Adversarial Robustness

ISO/IEC 23894 can structure the identification, analysis, treatment and monitoring of model-integrity risks, but the risk process does not establish poisoning-detection thresholds, extraction resistance, drift tolerances, embedding robustness or cryptographic acceptance criteria. Reuse context, risk-owner, treatment and monitoring records; retain GAISSF VTS results as the operating-effectiveness evidence.

D2 - Runtime Security & Adversarial Defense

The ISO risk process helps define misuse scenarios, affected stakeholders, likelihood, consequence, treatment priority and monitoring. It does not prescribe prompt-injection corpora, jailbreak success thresholds, multimodal attack coverage, tool-call restrictions or cross-context isolation. Runtime tests should be repeated after prompt, model, tool, retrieval or interface changes.

D3 - Agentic Risk & Autonomous System Security

Agentic risks require explicit authority boundaries, action inventories, tool permissions, trust relationships, memory controls and human intervention points. ISO-aligned risk records can justify those decisions, while GAISSF VTS evidence demonstrates whether least agency, inter-agent security, prompt-chain detection, memory isolation and embodied safeguards operate as intended.

D4 - Supply Chain & Third-Party AI Security

Supplier and dependency risks align well with context, communication, treatment, monitoring and review. However, evidence reuse is valid only where the same supplier, model, API, MCP server, artifact, version and deployment context remain in scope. AI BOM, scanning, registry-vetting, behavioral-monitoring and SCA evidence should be refreshed after supplier or component change.

D5 - Content Safety & Output Integrity

Risk-management records can document harmful-output, privacy, copyright and transparency scenarios and treatment choices. They do not define universal content thresholds, leakage tolerances, watermark robustness or privacy-preserving ML acceptance criteria. Evaluation datasets, policies and legal assumptions should be versioned with each VTS result.

D6 - Governance, Accountability & Human Oversight

This domain has the strongest process alignment because ISO/IEC 23894 emphasizes governance, accountability, resources, communication, evaluation and improvement. The remaining gap is operating-effectiveness evidence: intervention timing, audit completeness, model-card sufficiency, incident exercise performance, decommissioning closure, vendor oversight and resilience test results.

D7 - Human & Societal Harms

The ISO risk structure supports stakeholder identification, consultation, harm scenarios, treatment and monitoring. GAISSF adds concrete simulation, training, authentication and response evidence. Organizations should reassess these controls when threat tactics, user populations, communication channels or societal impact assumptions change.

D8 - Regulatory Alignment & Compliance

Risk and governance records can support regulatory mapping and evidence traceability, but legal applicability and authoritative guidance change over time. D8 evidence should be reviewed at least annually and whenever a jurisdiction, sector, intended use, model classification, reporting rule or enforcement position changes.

D9 - Physical AI Safety

Physical-AI controls require system-specific safety envelopes and HIL or certified-simulator evidence. ISO risk guidance can support hazard scenarios, risk criteria, treatment selection and monitoring, but it does not establish stopping distances, emergency-stop latency, sensor-failure response, actuator-command limits or incident-evidence timing. Mock-mode CI output is not physical certification evidence.

Annex F - Re-validation Decision Workflow

A mapping or evidence-reuse decision should be reopened when any of the following events occurs. The record-level trigger in Annex B is controlling where it is more specific.

Trigger class Examples Required action
Scheduled Annual review; planned governance review Confirm source editions, system scope, owners, evidence freshness, residual risk and VTS validity.
System change New model version, fine-tuning, prompt/tool change, new agent authority, hardware or environment change Reassess context and risk; rerun affected VTS; update treatment and residual-risk approval.
Threat change New vulnerability, adversarial technique, supplier issue, social-engineering pattern or physical threat Update scenarios and likelihood; validate detection and treatment effectiveness.
Regulatory change New law, regulator guidance, enforcement action, jurisdiction or sector rule Revalidate D8 applicability, evidence and public claims.
Source change Revision to ISO/IEC 23894, GAISSF normative documents, schema or VTS Perform semantic impact analysis and issue controlled mapping revision.
Incident or failure Security event, harm, near miss, audit finding, failed exercise or failed VTS Correct the control, reassess residual risk and verify corrective-action effectiveness.

Evidence Reuse Decision Record

  • Identify the original evidence owner, source system, collection date and assessed scope.

  • Confirm that the current AI system, model, data, environment, supplier and intended use remain materially equivalent.

  • Verify authenticity, integrity, completeness, retention and chain of custody.

  • Determine whether the evidence demonstrates process completion, implementation or operating effectiveness.

  • Record accepted limitations, compensating tests, residual gaps, approval and expiry date.

  • Link the decision to the GAISSF control, VTS ID and re-validation trigger.