GAISSF to CRO 021 Crosswalk
Public crosswalk publication mapping GAISSF v1.0 to CRO 021, with scope, method, limitations and traceability.
GAISSF™ v1.0
ISO/IEC 23894 MAPPING - EXECUTIVE BRIEF
Risk alignment, evidence reuse and assurance implications
Version 1.2 | Final Source-Bounded Publication
Methodology Note
This brief summarizes the coordinated CRO-021 Technical Report. ISO/IEC 23894:2023 document identity and structure were confirmed from official metadata and an authorized preview. Detailed mappings are analytical and require revalidation when licensed full text becomes available. ISO/IEC 23894 is guidance, not a certifiable requirements standard.
Executive Decision
Adopt ISO/IEC 23894-aligned risk documentation as the common governance layer, but do not substitute it for GAISSF technical validation. Risk records explain why a treatment was selected; GAISSF VTS evidence demonstrates whether the treatment operates effectively.
Decision Boundaries
| Permitted use | Not supported |
|---|---|
| Risk alignment, treatment traceability, evidence reuse planning and gap analysis | Claims of ISO certification, GAISSF equivalence or automatic audit acceptance |
| Reuse of qualified risk registers, approvals, consultation and monitoring records | Replacing runtime, agentic, privacy or physical-AI testing with policy documents |
| Source-bounded clause and lifecycle mapping | Claiming full-text verification without the licensed ISO standard |
1. Evidence Reuse and Assurance Boundary
Evidence that can be reused
- AI risk policy, scope, context and risk criteria.
- Risk registers, scenario analysis, treatment plans and residual-risk approvals.
- Roles, consultation records, monitoring results and management reporting.
- Lifecycle and change-review records that remain current and within the same assessment boundary.
Evidence that still requires GAISSF validation
- Runtime adversarial, prompt-injection, jailbreak and tool-abuse testing.
- Model-integrity, provenance, drift, extraction and cryptographic testing.
- Agent authority, memory, inter-agent trust and exfiltration safeguards.
- Content-safety, privacy, supply-chain and regulatory evidence checks.
- Physical-AI HIL or certified-simulator tests and signed evidence.
Acceptance test for reused evidence
| Question | Required answer |
|---|---|
| Same scope? | System, model, data, environment, supplier and intended use are materially equivalent. |
| Authentic and intact? | Source, owner, date, integrity and chain of custody are verifiable. |
| Current? | Evidence remains within its review period and no trigger has invalidated it. |
| Sufficient? | Evidence demonstrates the claimed process or outcome, with limitations recorded. |
| Effective? | Where operating effectiveness is claimed, VTS or equivalent independent evidence exists. |
2. Coverage and Lifecycle Implications
The mapping covers all 59 GAISSF controls. Governance and regulatory controls align most strongly with ISO/IEC 23894 risk processes; technical runtime, agentic and physical controls retain the largest validation gap.
| Domain | Primary lifecycle relevance | Executive implication |
|---|---|---|
| D1 | Data, training, validation, monitoring | Risk records support treatment; VTS proves model integrity. |
| D2 | Validation, deployment, operation | Re-test after prompt, tool, model or interface change. |
| D3 | Design, integration, operation, retirement | Authority and memory boundaries require technical evidence. |
| D4 | Acquisition, integration, supplier monitoring | Supplier evidence is version- and context-dependent. |
| D5 | Data, design, validation, user interaction | Evaluation datasets and policy assumptions must be controlled. |
| D6 | All stages | Strong governance alignment; operating effectiveness remains testable. |
| D7 | Impact assessment, deployment, incident response | Stakeholder and threat assumptions require periodic refresh. |
| D8 | All stages | Legal and regulatory evidence requires annual/event-driven review. |
| D9 | Physical integration, HIL validation, operation | Mock CI output is not physical certification evidence. |
Notably absent from risk guidance alone
- Attack corpora and technical thresholds.
- Agent memory isolation and least-agency enforcement.
- Content, privacy and watermark robustness criteria.
- Actuator interlocks, safe-state timing and emergency-stop latency.
- Universal acceptable-risk, fairness, safety or legal-compliance thresholds.
3. Financial and Governance Framing
Evidence-Reuse Economics
Use a transparent planning formula rather than a generic savings claim:
Estimated Audit Efficiency Gain = (hours of redundant risk documentation avoided × blended hourly rate) - incremental GAISSF VTS execution cost.
Illustrative planning example only: 80 avoided hours × $120/hour - $4,000 VTS execution = $5,600 estimated net efficiency gain. Confidence range: ±15%. Actual results depend on evidence quality, scope overlap, assessor acceptance, automation and test complexity.
Governance controls
- Approve reuse only after scope, authenticity, currency, completeness and effectiveness checks.
- Maintain one risk-to-control-to-VTS traceability chain.
- Assign owners for treatment, residual-risk approval and revalidation.
- Treat demo or mock HIL output as engineering evidence only.
- Record expiry dates and trigger-based review conditions for reused evidence.
Incident response maturity
D6-CTL-04 retains its normative tabletop/readiness validation. More mature organizations may add an automated playbook profile for detection, containment, rollback, evidence capture and escalation. This is supplementary assurance and does not create a new GAISSF control.
4. Risks, Review Triggers and Recommended Action
Primary limitations
- The mapping is not full-text verified against a licensed ISO/IEC 23894 copy.
- Alignment does not establish certification, conformity, legal compliance or technical effectiveness.
- ISO risk guidance does not define GAISSF pass criteria or universal acceptable-risk thresholds.
- System, threat, regulatory or source changes can invalidate earlier evidence-reuse decisions.
Mandatory review triggers
| Trigger | Examples |
|---|---|
| Annual | Scheduled source, scope, evidence and residual-risk review. |
| System change | New model, fine-tuning, tool, agent authority, supplier, hardware or environment. |
| Threat change | New vulnerability, attack technique, harm scenario or near miss. |
| Regulatory change | New law, guidance, enforcement position, jurisdiction or sector. |
| Source change | Revision to ISO/IEC 23894, GAISSF, schema or VTS. |
| Failure | Incident, audit finding, exercise failure or VTS failure. |
Recommended operating action
Use CRO-021 as the common risk-alignment and evidence-reuse layer. Require GAISSF VTS or equivalent independent verification before claiming that a technical control is operating effectively. Revalidate annually, after material changes and when a licensed ISO/IEC 23894 text becomes available.
Full technical mapping — GAISSF to ISO/IEC 23894
The summary above is the Executive Brief companion. The complete source-bounded technical mapping — methodology, evidence-tier model, the full 59-control mapping register, reverse process index and practitioner annexes — follows in full below.
Executive Summary
CRO-021 maps the 59-control GAISSF v1.0 baseline to the publicly verifiable structure of ISO/IEC 23894:2023. It supports risk-register integration, evidence reuse and treatment traceability while preserving a strict distinction between risk-management process evidence and technical control-effectiveness evidence.
This edition is source-bounded. The clause structure is confirmed from official and authorized sources; detailed semantic alignments are ODA3 analytical inferences pending access to the complete licensed standard. The mapping therefore does not claim full-text verification, conformity, certification or equivalence.
| Measure | Result |
|---|---|
| GAISSF controls mapped | 59 |
| Strong partial | 13 |
| Partial | 5 |
| Supporting | 41 |
| Medium-High confidence | 13 |
| Medium confidence | 46 |
1. Purpose and Intended Use
This report provides a controlled crosswalk for aligning GAISSF control implementation with AI risk-management activities, reusing qualified risk evidence, identifying residual technical validation and planning future full-text re-verification.
2. Source Boundary and Authority
The external source baseline is ISO/IEC 23894:2023. The exact external sources used are the ISO official standard record and abstract, together with the ANSI-authorized five-page preview. The complete licensed text was not available. GAISSF-NOR-001, GAISSF-NOR-004, the GAISSF evidence schema and the actual GAISSF VTS v1.0.1 release package are the primary controlled GAISSF sources.
3. Evidence-Tier Model
The report uses inline evidence-tier tags in Sections 4-8 so readers can distinguish controlled evidence from source-bounded inference and recommendations.
| Tier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| T1 | Primary controlled evidence: GAISSF normative documents, schema and actual VTS v1.0.1 release files. |
| T2 | Authorized external structural evidence: ISO official metadata/abstract and ANSI-authorized preview. |
| T3 | ODA3 analytical inference: source-bounded mapping, rating and gap analysis. |
| T4 | Implementation recommendation or illustrative practice, not an ISO requirement. |
4. Mapping Methodology
[T1] GAISSF control identifiers, titles, VTS identifiers, test paths, test designs, pass criteria and evidence artifacts were derived from the controlled GAISSF v1.0 normative and VTS release materials.
[T2] The ISO/IEC 23894 document identity, clause hierarchy and annex headings were confirmed using the ISO official record and the ANSI-authorized five-page preview.
[T3] Each semantic mapping compares risk objective, scope, affected lifecycle stage, evidence, treatment and review purpose. Keyword similarity alone is not treated as alignment.
[T3] Relationship ratings are Strong partial, Partial, Supporting or Contextual. No rating means equivalence, conformity, certification or automatic evidence acceptance.
[T4] Every record includes a re-validation trigger and an ODA3-derived risk extension to operationalize GAISSF evidence needs without presenting those fields as ISO requirements.
5. Why the ODA3-Derived Risk Extension Is Necessary
[T2] ISO/IEC 23894 provides risk-management guidance and a process structure for identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and recording AI risk.
[T3] GAISSF additionally requires control-specific, testable and auditable technical outcomes. The ODA3-derived extension therefore specifies the data fields needed to connect a risk-treatment decision to a GAISSF control, its VTS, its acceptance criteria and its signed evidence.
[T4] In practical terms: the ISO-aligned process establishes that a treatment plan should exist; the ODA3 extension records the system boundary, scenario, stakeholder, owner, treatment, measurable acceptance criterion, VTS evidence, residual risk and review trigger needed for GAISSF assurance.
6. Evidence Reuse and Validation Rules
[T1] Reusable GAISSF evidence must remain relevant, authentic, traceable, complete, current and linked to the assessed scope. Certification-grade evidence must demonstrate implementation and operating effectiveness, not policy intent alone.
[T3] ISO-aligned risk registers, treatment plans, approvals, consultation records, monitoring results and review records can be reused only after scope, authenticity, currency, completeness and effectiveness qualification.
[T1] The exact VTS package path is recorded as oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/...; the shorter tests/... path remains the repository-relative test location. Demo or mock HIL output is not certification evidence.
[T4] For D6-CTL-04, organizations may add a supplementary automated incident-response validation profile for detection, containment, rollback, evidence capture and escalation. This is a recommended extension, not a new GAISSF control.
7. Relationship and Confidence Interpretation
[T3] Governance and regulatory controls generally receive Strong partial / Medium-High ratings because ISO/IEC 23894 structurally addresses governance, ownership, assessment, treatment, monitoring and reporting, while GAISSF adds precise technical mechanisms and test evidence.
[T3] Runtime, adversarial, agentic and physical-AI controls generally receive Supporting / Medium ratings because risk-management guidance can justify and monitor treatment but does not define attack corpora, technical thresholds, memory isolation, actuator interlocks or HIL pass criteria.
[T3] Shadow AI receives stronger alignment where discovery, ownership, context, treatment and monitoring form the primary control outcome, but GAISSF still requires explicit discovery coverage and evidence.
8. Coverage Summary and Lifecycle View
[T3] The complete 59-control register is placed in Annex B to preserve the narrative flow of the Technical Report. Annex C provides the reverse ISO-process index.
| Domain | Domain title | Controls | Relationship profile | Primary lifecycle stages |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Model Integrity & Adversarial Robustness | 9 | Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 9 | Data collection, processing and labelling; modelling and training; verification and validation; operation and monitoring. |
| D2 | Runtime Security & Adversarial Defense | 6 | Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 6 | Verification and validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; incident response and change management. |
| D3 | Agentic Risk & Autonomous System Security | 7 | Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 7 | System design; integration; deployment; operation and monitoring; change, transfer and decommissioning. |
| D4 | Supply Chain & Third-Party AI Security | 7 | Strong partial 1; Partial 0; Supporting 6 | Acquisition and sourcing; system integration; deployment; supplier monitoring; change and retirement. |
| D5 | Content Safety & Output Integrity | 6 | Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 6 | Data preparation; design and development; verification and validation; deployment; operation and user interaction. |
| D6 | Governance, Accountability & Human Oversight | 7 | Strong partial 7; Partial 0; Supporting 0 | All lifecycle stages, with emphasis on governance, approval gates, monitoring, incident response and retirement. |
| D7 | Human & Societal Harms | 5 | Strong partial 0; Partial 5; Supporting 0 | Design and impact assessment; verification and validation; deployment; operation; stakeholder communication and incident response. |
| D8 | Regulatory Alignment & Compliance | 5 | Strong partial 5; Partial 0; Supporting 0 | All lifecycle stages through legal, regulatory and assurance checkpoints, with periodic re-evaluation. |
| D9 | Physical AI Safety | 7 | Strong partial 0; Partial 0; Supporting 7 | System design; physical integration; HIL validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; emergency response and decommissioning. |
9. Operational Use Model
Use the risk register to identify the AI asset, scenario, affected stakeholders, uncertainty, likelihood, consequence and owner.
Link each selected treatment to the relevant GAISSF control and VTS record.
Qualify existing evidence before reuse and record any scope or freshness limitation.
Execute the VTS or an independently equivalent test where process evidence does not demonstrate the technical outcome.
Record residual risk, acceptance authority, expiry and review trigger.
Revalidate at least annually and whenever the control-specific trigger in Annex B occurs.
10. Regulatory and Standards Evolution
Regulatory and standards references evolve. D8 evidence and mappings shall be reviewed at least annually and whenever authoritative legislation, regulatory guidance, enforcement practice, ISO publications or GAISSF controlled sources change. A revision that materially affects scope, interpretation, evidence or technical validation shall trigger controlled downstream impact analysis.
11. Notably Absent from ISO/IEC 23894 Risk Guidance
The following capabilities are not demonstrated merely by following a risk-management process and remain subject to GAISSF-specific implementation and VTS evidence:
Runtime adversarial-defense thresholds for prompt injection, jailbreaks, multimodal attacks, tool-call abuse and cross-context hijacking.
Model-integrity pass criteria for poisoning, extraction, drift, federated learning, embeddings, adapters, merges, quantization and cryptographic hardening.
Agentic enforcement mechanisms for least agency, inter-agent trust, chained prompts, memory isolation, exfiltration prevention and secure memory lifecycle.
Control-specific supply-chain test procedures for AI BOMs, model scanning, registry vetting, MCP behavior, external APIs, shadow AI and dependency analysis.
Content-safety and privacy evaluation thresholds for harmful content, PII leakage, copyright, watermarking and privacy-preserving ML.
Control-specific operating-effectiveness evidence for human intervention, audit trails, model cards, incident readiness, decommissioning, vendor governance and resilience.
Physical-AI HIL pass criteria for harm boundaries, safe states, emergency stops, cyber-physical detection, sensor integrity, actuator commands and incident evidence preservation.
Universal legal compliance, sector approval, fairness, safety or acceptable residual-risk thresholds.
12. Publication, Claims and Change-Control Rules
Publish CRO-021 as informative, source-bounded and version-controlled.
Do not claim full-text verification until a licensed ISO/IEC 23894:2023 copy has been reviewed.
Do not describe ISO/IEC 23894 as a certifiable requirements standard or claim that alignment demonstrates certification.
Do not redistribute protected ISO/IEC text or the preview.
Publish the Technical Report, Executive Brief, XLSX register, JSON register, version history and checksum manifest as one coordinated package.
Record every mapping, source, VTS, schema or claims change in version_history.md.
Annex A - Register Field Definitions
| Field | Definition |
|---|---|
| vts_test_file | Repository-relative path inside the VTS release. |
| vts_package_path | Exact path inside the supplied oda3-gaissf-vts release package. |
| vts_test_design | High-level validation action. |
| vts_pass_criteria | Measurable conditions required for the VTS result. |
| vts_evidence_artifacts | Evidence object or artifact produced by successful execution. |
| relationship_justification | Why the selected relationship rating applies. |
| revalidation_trigger | Events requiring reassessment of the mapping and evidence. |
| primary_ai_lifecycle_stage | Primary ISO/IEC 23894 Annex C lifecycle relevance. |
| source_tier_basis | Evidence tiers supporting the mapping. |
| context_adaptation_note | Context-specific tailoring note where the reference VTS cannot be universal. |
| supplementary_validation_profile | Optional additional assurance activity that does not create a new normative control. |
Annex B - 59-Control Mapping Register
| ID / Title | ISO/IEC 23894 anchors | Rating / rationale | VTS design / criteria | Evidence artifacts | Risk extension / re-validation trigger |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1-CTL-01 Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-01-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_dataset_provenance.py Design: Provide dataset metadata with hash and source; execute poisoning detection scan against GAISSF™ Benchmark Dataset (Category: Data Poisoning) (open-source options: Giskard, CleanLab) Pass: hash_verified = True; source_in_allowlist = True; poisoning_score = 0; test_coverage >= 1000 samples |
JSON with hash, source, scan results, poisoning_score Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
| D1-CTL-02 Model Extraction Resistance |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Model Extraction Resistance; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-02-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_model_extraction.py Design: Execute 10,000 queries at maximum allowed rate against production inference endpoint using GAISSF™ Extraction Benchmark Suite Pass: extraction_success_count < 10 (0.1% of queries); detection_alerts_triggered = True; rate_limiting_enforced = True |
JSON with extraction_success_count, detection_alerts, rate_limit_logs Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
| D1-CTL-03 Behavioral Drift Detection |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C; 5.6; 5.7.1; 5.7.2 | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Behavioral Drift Detection; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-03-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_behavioral_drift.py Design: Monitor model predictions over 30-day period; calculate KL divergence against established baseline Pass: max_kl_divergence < 0.05; accuracy_drop < 5% over 30 days; alert_generated_for_any_drift_event = True |
JSON with daily_kl_divergence_values, accuracy_trend, alert_log Retention: 1 year (Foundational), 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
| D1-CTL-04 Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-04-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_federated_poisoning.py Design: Simulate malicious client submitting poisoned gradients in federated learning simulation environment Pass: malicious_gradient_detection_rate >= 95%; poisoned_gradients_excluded_from_aggregation = True |
JSON with detection_rate, aggregation_log, client_anomaly_scores Retention: 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
| D1-CTL-05 Embedding Space Robustness |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Embedding Space Robustness; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-05-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_embedding_robustness.py Design: Apply adversarial perturbations (FGM, PGD) to embedding inputs; measure classification change rate Pass: classification_change_rate < 5% under bounded perturbation (epsilon=0.1); certified_radius_measured = True |
JSON with classification_change_rate, certified_radius, attack_log Retention: 3 years (Operational), 7 years (Optimized) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
| D1-CTL-06 Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening |
4; 5.3; 5.4.1; 5.5; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.6; 6.7; Annex B; Annex C | Supporting / Medium ISO/IEC 23894 provides the risk-management process used to justify, prioritize and review Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening; the technical design, test procedure and pass criteria remain GAISSF-specific. |
D1-CTL-06-VTS-001 oda3-gaissf-vts/tests/d1_model_integrity/test_pqc_signing.py Design: Attempt to verify model signature using RSA-2048 while quantum-safe algorithm is available; test TLS downgrade to pre-quantum cipher suite Pass: legacy_rsa_signature_rejected = True; tls_downgrade_blocked = True; pqc_key_exchange_enabled = True |
JSON with signature_verification_log, tls_cipher_suite_audit, pqc_migration_plan Retention: 7 years (all tiers — long-term cryptographic assurance) |
ODA3-derived risk extension: record the AI asset/system boundary, threat or harm scenario, affected stakeholders, likelihood/consequence rationale, risk owner, treatment decision, measurable acceptance criteria, validation evidence, residual risk, review trigger and linkage to the GAISSF control/VTS. Trigger: annual scheduled review; revision to ISO/IEC 23894; material GAISSF/VTS revision; new model version or fine-tuning; training-data or provenance change; material drift or robustness finding |
Annex C - Reverse ISO/IEC 23894 Process Index
| Reference | Topic | Source-bounded explanation | Mapped GAISSF controls |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Principles of AI risk management | Risk-management principles applied to AI-specific uncertainty, impacts and organizational objectives. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.1 | Framework - General | General design and operation of the risk-management framework. | D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07 |
| 5.2 | Leadership and commitment | Leadership sponsorship and accountability for AI risk management. | D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07 |
| 5.3 | Integration | Integration of AI risk management into governance, processes and decision-making. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.4.1 | Understanding the organization and its context | External/internal context, roles, objectives, constraints and stakeholders. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.4.2 | Articulating risk-management commitment | Policy, commitment and management direction. | D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07 |
| 5.4.3 | Roles, authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities | Ownership and accountability for risk decisions and activities. | D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07 |
| 5.4.4 | Allocating resources | People, competence, data, technology, time and funding for risk management. | D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.4.5 | Communication and consultation | Internal and external communication and stakeholder consultation. | D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-05, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-03 |
| 5.5 | Implementation | Operational implementation of the risk-management framework. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.6 | Evaluation | Evaluation of framework design, implementation and effectiveness. | D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.7.1 | Adapting | Adaptation to changes in context, systems, impacts and risk. | D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-07, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07 |
| 5.7.2 | Continually improving | Continual improvement of the risk-management framework. | D1-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-07, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.1 | Risk-management process - General | Application of a structured and iterative risk-management process. | No direct anchor |
| 6.2 | Communication and consultation | Communication and consultation throughout the process. | D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-05, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-03 |
| 6.3.2 | Defining the scope | Boundaries, assumptions, decisions, assets and lifecycle scope. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.3.3 | External and internal context | Context and stakeholder factors relevant to a specific assessment. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.3.4 | Defining risk criteria | Likelihood, consequence, acceptability, prioritization and decision criteria. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05 |
| 6.4.2 | Risk identification | Identification of threats, harms, events, causes, consequences and affected stakeholders. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.4.3 | Risk analysis | Analysis of likelihood, consequence, uncertainty, controls and residual risk. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.4.4 | Risk evaluation | Comparison against criteria and prioritization for treatment. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05 |
| 6.5.2 | Selection of risk-treatment options | Selection and justification of treatments, including avoidance, modification, sharing and acceptance. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.5.3 | Preparing and implementing treatment plans | Treatment plan, ownership, resources, schedule, acceptance criteria and residual-risk approval. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-06 |
| 6.6 | Monitoring and review | Monitoring assumptions, controls, indicators, incidents and changes. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| 6.7 | Recording and reporting | Risk records, decisions, evidence, reporting and traceability. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| Annex A | Objectives | Examples of objectives that can be affected by AI risk. | D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-03 |
| Annex B | Risk sources | Illustrative AI risk sources for identification and analysis. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
| Annex C | AI system lifecycle | Application of risk management across AI lifecycle stages. | D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-02, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-02, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-04, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H03, D7-CTL-H04, D7-CTL-H05, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06, D9-CTL-07 |
Annex D - GAISSF Domain to AI Lifecycle Map
| Domain | Primary lifecycle stage alignment |
|---|---|
| D1 | Data collection, processing and labelling; modelling and training; verification and validation; operation and monitoring. |
| D2 | Verification and validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; incident response and change management. |
| D3 | System design; integration; deployment; operation and monitoring; change, transfer and decommissioning. |
| D4 | Acquisition and sourcing; system integration; deployment; supplier monitoring; change and retirement. |
| D5 | Data preparation; design and development; verification and validation; deployment; operation and user interaction. |
| D6 | All lifecycle stages, with emphasis on governance, approval gates, monitoring, incident response and retirement. |
| D7 | Design and impact assessment; verification and validation; deployment; operation; stakeholder communication and incident response. |
| D8 | All lifecycle stages through legal, regulatory and assurance checkpoints, with periodic re-evaluation. |
| D9 | System design; physical integration; HIL validation; deployment; operation and monitoring; emergency response and decommissioning. |
Annex E - Domain-Level Practitioner Interpretation
D1 - Model Integrity & Adversarial Robustness
ISO/IEC 23894 can structure the identification, analysis, treatment and monitoring of model-integrity risks, but the risk process does not establish poisoning-detection thresholds, extraction resistance, drift tolerances, embedding robustness or cryptographic acceptance criteria. Reuse context, risk-owner, treatment and monitoring records; retain GAISSF VTS results as the operating-effectiveness evidence.
D2 - Runtime Security & Adversarial Defense
The ISO risk process helps define misuse scenarios, affected stakeholders, likelihood, consequence, treatment priority and monitoring. It does not prescribe prompt-injection corpora, jailbreak success thresholds, multimodal attack coverage, tool-call restrictions or cross-context isolation. Runtime tests should be repeated after prompt, model, tool, retrieval or interface changes.
D3 - Agentic Risk & Autonomous System Security
Agentic risks require explicit authority boundaries, action inventories, tool permissions, trust relationships, memory controls and human intervention points. ISO-aligned risk records can justify those decisions, while GAISSF VTS evidence demonstrates whether least agency, inter-agent security, prompt-chain detection, memory isolation and embodied safeguards operate as intended.
D4 - Supply Chain & Third-Party AI Security
Supplier and dependency risks align well with context, communication, treatment, monitoring and review. However, evidence reuse is valid only where the same supplier, model, API, MCP server, artifact, version and deployment context remain in scope. AI BOM, scanning, registry-vetting, behavioral-monitoring and SCA evidence should be refreshed after supplier or component change.
D5 - Content Safety & Output Integrity
Risk-management records can document harmful-output, privacy, copyright and transparency scenarios and treatment choices. They do not define universal content thresholds, leakage tolerances, watermark robustness or privacy-preserving ML acceptance criteria. Evaluation datasets, policies and legal assumptions should be versioned with each VTS result.
D6 - Governance, Accountability & Human Oversight
This domain has the strongest process alignment because ISO/IEC 23894 emphasizes governance, accountability, resources, communication, evaluation and improvement. The remaining gap is operating-effectiveness evidence: intervention timing, audit completeness, model-card sufficiency, incident exercise performance, decommissioning closure, vendor oversight and resilience test results.
D7 - Human & Societal Harms
The ISO risk structure supports stakeholder identification, consultation, harm scenarios, treatment and monitoring. GAISSF adds concrete simulation, training, authentication and response evidence. Organizations should reassess these controls when threat tactics, user populations, communication channels or societal impact assumptions change.
D8 - Regulatory Alignment & Compliance
Risk and governance records can support regulatory mapping and evidence traceability, but legal applicability and authoritative guidance change over time. D8 evidence should be reviewed at least annually and whenever a jurisdiction, sector, intended use, model classification, reporting rule or enforcement position changes.
D9 - Physical AI Safety
Physical-AI controls require system-specific safety envelopes and HIL or certified-simulator evidence. ISO risk guidance can support hazard scenarios, risk criteria, treatment selection and monitoring, but it does not establish stopping distances, emergency-stop latency, sensor-failure response, actuator-command limits or incident-evidence timing. Mock-mode CI output is not physical certification evidence.
Annex F - Re-validation Decision Workflow
A mapping or evidence-reuse decision should be reopened when any of the following events occurs. The record-level trigger in Annex B is controlling where it is more specific.
| Trigger class | Examples | Required action |
|---|---|---|
| Scheduled | Annual review; planned governance review | Confirm source editions, system scope, owners, evidence freshness, residual risk and VTS validity. |
| System change | New model version, fine-tuning, prompt/tool change, new agent authority, hardware or environment change | Reassess context and risk; rerun affected VTS; update treatment and residual-risk approval. |
| Threat change | New vulnerability, adversarial technique, supplier issue, social-engineering pattern or physical threat | Update scenarios and likelihood; validate detection and treatment effectiveness. |
| Regulatory change | New law, regulator guidance, enforcement action, jurisdiction or sector rule | Revalidate D8 applicability, evidence and public claims. |
| Source change | Revision to ISO/IEC 23894, GAISSF normative documents, schema or VTS | Perform semantic impact analysis and issue controlled mapping revision. |
| Incident or failure | Security event, harm, near miss, audit finding, failed exercise or failed VTS | Correct the control, reassess residual risk and verify corrective-action effectiveness. |
Evidence Reuse Decision Record
Identify the original evidence owner, source system, collection date and assessed scope.
Confirm that the current AI system, model, data, environment, supplier and intended use remain materially equivalent.
Verify authenticity, integrity, completeness, retention and chain of custody.
Determine whether the evidence demonstrates process completion, implementation or operating effectiveness.
Record accepted limitations, compensating tests, residual gaps, approval and expiry date.
Link the decision to the GAISSF control, VTS ID and re-validation trigger.