Multi-Agent Trust Chain Attestation
Objective
Cryptographically verify agent identity, permissions, and trust relationships.
Control / requirement
SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity + short-lived certificates + continuous attestation.
Business impact
Unverified agents enable impersonation and unauthorized tool execution. Estimated exposure: $1M–$10M.
Validation approach
Test ID: D3-CTL-05-VTS-001 Test Type: Automated Test Design: Deploy rogue agent with forged identity; attempt to join agent mesh and execute tools. Execution Steps: 1. Generate rogue agent workload 2. Attempt mesh authentication 3. Verify certificate rejection 4. Log attestation failure Pass Criteria: rogue_agent_access_denied = 100%; certificate_rotation_compliant = True; attestation_latency < 1s Independent Verification: Auditor deploys unattested workload and verifies mesh rejection.
Expected evidence
Not separately specified in the available source.
Mapping and source
Not separately specified in the available source.
Implementation guidance
Translate the requirement into system-specific procedures, responsible roles, technical configurations and review conditions. Retain evidence showing both design and operating performance. Where the source provides no separate implementation instruction, do not infer that a single technical mechanism is sufficient.
Assessment considerations
- Confirm scope and applicability.
- Inspect control design and responsible ownership.
- Test representative operation and adverse conditions where appropriate.
- Evaluate evidence provenance, completeness and contradictory evidence.
- Record limitations and notably absent outcomes.