Telemetry Integrity and Tamper-Evidence
Objective
Ensure telemetry cannot be silently altered after collection, including by a compromised primary system attempting to conceal its own anomalous behavior.
Control / requirement
Telemetry cryptographically signed or hash-chained at the point of collection; independent verification of the chain available during investigation.
Applicability
All physical AI systems where telemetry may be relied upon for incident investigation or assurance.
Expected evidence
Telemetry signing architecture; chain-verification test records. [T2]
Assurance expectation
Test evidence demonstrating tamper detection under simulated post-hoc alteration attempts.
Dependencies
PAI-SF-ATT-003 (key custody) — signing keys must themselves be protected for this control to hold.
Exclusions
Not applicable to non-safety-relevant telemetry with no investigative or evidentiary purpose.
Maturity / conformance relevance
Expected at Operational and High-Assurance levels.
Ecosystem relationship
Telemetry integrity is foundational evidence for UAIF™ classification and AI-IRF™ investigation — a compromised telemetry chain undermines both.