{ "document": { "id": "GAISSF-CRO-026", "title": "GAISSF™–MITRE ATT&CK Mapping", "version": "1.0", "status": "Draft for Publication", "classification": "Informative crosswalk / public", "publisher": "ODA3 Institute", "legal_entity": "ODA3 Pvt Ltd", "publication_date": "2026-06-29", "verification_date": "2026-10-06" }, "source_baseline": { "gaissf": "GAISSF™ v1.0; 59 controls / 9 domains; Applicable-Control Baseline = all 52 controls in D1-D8 plus D9 where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope.", "mitre_attack": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2; current as of 2026-10-06; v19.0 released 2026-04-28; v19.2 agile update released 2026-08-06.", "primary_domain": "Enterprise", "excluded_domains": [ "Mobile", "ICS" ], "source_urls": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/resources/versions/", "https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/", "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/", "https://attack.mitre.org/resources/attack-data-and-tools/" ] }, "statistics": { "gaissf_controls": 59, "enterprise_tactics": 15, "priority_techniques": 100, "forward_mapping_records": 112, "reverse_tactic_records": 15 }, "controlled_vocabulary": { "relationship": { "SP": "Strong partial", "P": "Partial", "S": "Supporting", "C": "Contextual", "N": "No material mapping", "O": "Outside scope", "U": "Unable to determine" }, "confidence": [ "High", "Medium-High", "Medium", "Low", "Not Rated" ] }, "limitations": [ "ATT&CK describes observed adversary behavior and is not a prescriptive control, compliance, certification, or assurance framework.", "A mapping does not prove prevention, detection, mitigation effectiveness, test coverage, evidence sufficiency, or operating effectiveness.", "The priority technique inventory is a selected Enterprise subset and does not replace the complete official ATT&CK v19.2 dataset.", "ATT&CK v19 split the former Enterprise Defense Evasion tactic into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); the source package used the pre-v19 tactic model and has been reconciled here.", "The legacy T1562 Impair Defenses parent entry in the source priority inventory is not a current v19.2 technique entry and is replaced here by T1685 Disable or Modify Tools only for the bounded source context; no automatic inheritance of former T1562 sub-techniques is asserted.", "Sub-techniques, procedure examples, current Detection Strategies/Analytics, platforms, groups/software/campaigns, and environment-specific threat relevance require separate analysis.", "Mobile and ICS are excluded from this edition and require separate controlled mappings.", "D9 is additional/conditional. Where Physical AI is in scope, PAI-SF™ v1.0 may be used alongside GAISSF; CSX-PAISF-004 is mapping only.", "ATT&CK major/minor/agile content changes trigger revalidation of affected mapping records.", "Independent ATT&CK/crosswalk review and explicit publication approval remain open." ], "gaissf_controls": [ { "id": "D1-CTL-01", "title": "Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-02", "title": "Model Extraction Resistance", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-03", "title": "Behavioral Drift Detection", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-04", "title": "Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-05", "title": "Embedding Space Robustness", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-06", "title": "Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-07", "title": "Lora/Adapter Integrity Verification", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-08", "title": "Model Merge Attack Detection", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D1-CTL-09", "title": "Quantization Backdoor Screening", "domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-01", "title": "Direct Prompt Injection Prevention", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-02", "title": "Indirect Prompt Injection Prevention", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-03", "title": "Jailbreak Resistance Testing", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-04", "title": "Multi-Modal Injection Defense", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-05", "title": "Function Call/Tool Call Injection Prevention", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D2-CTL-06", "title": "Cross-Context Hijacking Mitigation", "domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-01", "title": "Least Agency Enforcement", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-02", "title": "Inter-Agent Communication Security", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-03", "title": "Agentic Prompt Chaining Detection", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-04", "title": "Embodied Ai Safety Controls", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-05", "title": "Multi-Agent Trust Chain Attestation", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-06", "title": "Persistent Memory Exfiltration Prevention", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D3-CTL-07", "title": "Secure Memory Lifecycle Management", "domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-01", "title": "Ai Bill Of Materials (Ai Bom) Maintenance", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-02", "title": "Model File & Artifact Scanning", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-03", "title": "Model Hub & Registry Vetting", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-04", "title": "Mcp Server Behavioral Monitoring", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-05", "title": "Third-Party Ai Api Security Assessment", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-06", "title": "Shadow Ai Discovery & Governance", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D4-CTL-07", "title": "Ai Software Composition Analysis (Sca)", "domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-01", "title": "Harmful Content Blocking", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-02", "title": "Pii Leakage Prevention", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-03", "title": "Copyright Detection", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-04", "title": "Ai Watermarking Robustness", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-05", "title": "Privacy-By-Design Verification", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D5-CTL-06", "title": "Privacy-Preserving Ml Validation", "domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-01", "title": "Human-In-The-Loop For High-Risk Actions", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-02", "title": "Audit Trail Completeness", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-03", "title": "Ai Model Card Completeness", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-04", "title": "Ai Incident Response Readiness", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-05", "title": "Model Deprecation & Decommissioning", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-06", "title": "Third-Party Ai Vendor Governance", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D6-CTL-07", "title": "Ai Resilience & Business Continuity", "domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D7-CTL-H01", "title": "Ai-Generated Phishing Simulation", "domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D7-CTL-H02", "title": "Deepfake Detection Training", "domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D7-CTL-H03", "title": "Out-Of-Band Authentication", "domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D7-CTL-H04", "title": "Ai Social Engineering Ir", "domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D7-CTL-H05", "title": "Ai-Enhanced External Attack Defense", "domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D8-CTL-01", "title": "Eu Ai Act Risk Tier Mapping", "domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D8-CTL-02", "title": "Iso 42001 Gap Analysis", "domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D8-CTL-03", "title": "Gpai Technical Documentation Verification", "domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D8-CTL-04", "title": "Dora Ict Incident Reporting (Financial Sector)", "domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D8-CTL-05", "title": "Nist Sp 800-218A Compliance Check", "domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "applicable_control_baseline": "Canonical D1-D8 Applicable-Control Baseline", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-01", "title": "Physical Harm Boundary Enforcement", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-02", "title": "Safe State And Graceful Degradation", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-03", "title": "Human Override And Emergency Stop", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-04", "title": "Cyber-Physical Attack Detection", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-05", "title": "Physical Environment Integrity Monitoring", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-06", "title": "Actuator Command Verification", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." }, { "id": "D9-CTL-07", "title": "Physical Incident Evidence Preservation", "domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "applicable_control_baseline": "Additional / conditional; include where Physical AI or cyber-physical actuation is in scope", "validation_boundary": "Use independently controlled threat-informed validation appropriate to the control, system boundary, relevant ATT&CK behaviors and assurance objective. Held/internal GAISSF VTS and unpublished test harnesses are not public-package dependencies.", "evidence_expectation": "Scope-linked threat model, telemetry, detection, test, incident, red/purple-team and assurance records with provenance, configuration/version, inputs, outputs, exceptions, reviewer identity, date and limitations." } ], "attack_tactics": [ { "id": "TA0043", "name": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "TA0042", "name": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "TA0001", "name": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "TA0002", "name": "Execution" }, { "id": "TA0003", "name": "Persistence" }, { "id": "TA0004", "name": "Privilege Escalation" }, { "id": "TA0005", "name": "Stealth" }, { "id": "TA0112", "name": "Defense Impairment" }, { "id": "TA0006", "name": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "TA0007", "name": "Discovery" }, { "id": "TA0008", "name": "Lateral Movement" }, { "id": "TA0009", "name": "Collection" }, { "id": "TA0011", "name": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "TA0010", "name": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "TA0040", "name": "Impact" } ], "priority_attack_techniques": [ { "id": "T1595", "name": "Active Scanning", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1592", "name": "Gather Victim Host Information", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1589", "name": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1590", "name": "Gather Victim Network Information", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1591", "name": "Gather Victim Org Information", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1593", "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1594", "name": "Search Victim-Owned Websites", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1596", "name": "Search Open Technical Databases", "tactic": "Reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1583", "name": "Acquire Infrastructure", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1584", "name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1585", "name": "Establish Accounts", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1586", "name": "Compromise Accounts", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1587", "name": "Develop Capabilities", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1588", "name": "Obtain Capabilities", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1608", "name": "Stage Capabilities", "tactic": "Resource Development" }, { "id": "T1189", "name": "Drive-by Compromise", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1190", "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1133", "name": "External Remote Services", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1566", "name": "Phishing", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1195", "name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1078", "name": "Valid Accounts", "tactic": "Initial Access" }, { "id": "T1059", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1203", "name": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1204", "name": "User Execution", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1047", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1129", "name": "Shared Modules", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1106", "name": "Native API", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1053", "name": "Scheduled Task/Job", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1127", "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "tactic": "Execution" }, { "id": "T1098", "name": "Account Manipulation", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1547", "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1136", "name": "Create Account", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1505", "name": "Server Software Component", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1525", "name": "Implant Internal Image", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1554", "name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1053.003", "name": "Scheduled Task/Job: Cron", "tactic": "Persistence" }, { "id": "T1068", "name": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "tactic": "Privilege Escalation" }, { "id": "T1548", "name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "tactic": "Privilege Escalation" }, { "id": "T1134", "name": "Access Token Manipulation", "tactic": "Privilege Escalation" }, { "id": "T1484", "name": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "tactic": "Privilege Escalation" }, { "id": "T1027", "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1070", "name": "Indicator Removal", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1036", "name": "Masquerading", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1685", "name": "Disable or Modify Tools", "tactic": "Defense Impairment", "source_note": "Replaces the legacy pre-v19 T1562 Impair Defenses parent entry used in the source package; current v19.2 technique scope must not be inferred to include every former T1562 sub-technique." }, { "id": "T1553", "name": "Subvert Trust Controls", "tactic": "Defense Impairment" }, { "id": "T1218", "name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1222", "name": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "tactic": "Defense Impairment" }, { "id": "T1497", "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1574", "name": "Hijack Execution Flow", "tactic": "Stealth" }, { "id": "T1110", "name": "Brute Force", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1555", "name": "Credentials from Password Stores", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1552", "name": "Unsecured Credentials", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1003", "name": "OS Credential Dumping", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1528", "name": "Steal Application Access Token", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1539", "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1649", "name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1621", "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "tactic": "Credential Access" }, { "id": "T1087", "name": "Account Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1580", "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1613", "name": "Container and Resource Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1526", "name": "Cloud Service Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1083", "name": "File and Directory Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1049", "name": "System Network Connections Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1018", "name": "Remote System Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1518", "name": "Software Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1482", "name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1614", "name": "System Location Discovery", "tactic": "Discovery" }, { "id": "T1021", "name": "Remote Services", "tactic": "Lateral Movement" }, { "id": "T1570", "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer", "tactic": "Lateral Movement" }, { "id": "T1210", "name": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "tactic": "Lateral Movement" }, { "id": "T1550", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "tactic": "Lateral Movement" }, { "id": "T1119", "name": "Automated Collection", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1213", "name": "Data from Information Repositories", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1530", "name": "Data from Cloud Storage", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1114", "name": "Email Collection", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1005", "name": "Data from Local System", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1074", "name": "Data Staged", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1560", "name": "Archive Collected Data", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1056", "name": "Input Capture", "tactic": "Collection" }, { "id": "T1071", "name": "Application Layer Protocol", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1105", "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1090", "name": "Proxy", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1219", "name": "Remote Access Software", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1572", "name": "Protocol Tunneling", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1102", "name": "Web Service", "tactic": "Command and Control" }, { "id": "T1048", "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1567", "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1537", "name": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1020", "name": "Automated Exfiltration", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1041", "name": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1052", "name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "tactic": "Exfiltration" }, { "id": "T1486", "name": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1485", "name": "Data Destruction", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1490", "name": "Inhibit System Recovery", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1498", "name": "Network Denial of Service", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1499", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1565", "name": "Data Manipulation", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1531", "name": "Account Access Removal", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1529", "name": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "tactic": "Impact" }, { "id": "T1657", "name": "Financial Theft", "tactic": "Impact" } ], "forward_mappings": [ { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0001", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0002", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Dataset Provenance & Poisoning Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0003", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Extraction Resistance", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0004", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Extraction Resistance", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0005", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Behavioral Drift Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0006", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Behavioral Drift Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0007", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0008", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Federated Learning Poisoning Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0009", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Embedding Space Robustness", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0010", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Embedding Space Robustness", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0011", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Post-Quantum Model Signing & Crypto Hardening", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0012", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Lora/Adapter Integrity Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0013", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Lora/Adapter Integrity Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0014", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-08", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Merge Attack Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-08 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0015", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-08", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Merge Attack Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-08 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0016", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-09", "gaissf_control_title": "Quantization Backdoor Screening", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-09 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0017", "gaissf_control_id": "D1-CTL-09", "gaissf_control_title": "Quantization Backdoor Screening", "gaissf_domain": "D1: MODEL INTEGRITY & ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1554", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D1-CTL-09 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0018", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Direct Prompt Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1078", "attack_technique_name": "Valid Accounts", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0019", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Direct Prompt Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0020", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Indirect Prompt Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1485", "attack_technique_name": "Data Destruction", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1485 Data Destruction. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0021", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Indirect Prompt Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0022", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Jailbreak Resistance Testing", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1078", "attack_technique_name": "Valid Accounts", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0023", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Jailbreak Resistance Testing", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Collection", "attack_technique_id": "T1119", "attack_technique_name": "Automated Collection", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1119 Automated Collection. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0024", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Multi-Modal Injection Defense", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0025", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Multi-Modal Injection Defense", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "attack_technique_id": "T1059", "attack_technique_name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0026", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Function Call/Tool Call Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1078", "attack_technique_name": "Valid Accounts", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0027", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Function Call/Tool Call Injection Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "attack_technique_id": "T1203", "attack_technique_name": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0028", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Cross-Context Hijacking Mitigation", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "attack_technique_id": "T1047", "attack_technique_name": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0029", "gaissf_control_id": "D2-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Cross-Context Hijacking Mitigation", "gaissf_domain": "D2: RUNTIME SECURITY & ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D2-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0030", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Least Agency Enforcement", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0031", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Least Agency Enforcement", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Lateral Movement", "attack_technique_id": "T1021", "attack_technique_name": "Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1021 Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0032", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Least Agency Enforcement", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Lateral Movement", "attack_technique_id": "T1210", "attack_technique_name": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0033", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Inter-Agent Communication Security", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0034", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Inter-Agent Communication Security", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0035", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Agentic Prompt Chaining Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0036", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Agentic Prompt Chaining Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0037", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Embodied Ai Safety Controls", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "attack_technique_id": "T1059", "attack_technique_name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0038", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Embodied Ai Safety Controls", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Defense Impairment", "attack_technique_id": "T1553", "attack_technique_name": "Subvert Trust Controls", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1553 Subvert Trust Controls. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0039", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Multi-Agent Trust Chain Attestation", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1589", "attack_technique_name": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0040", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Multi-Agent Trust Chain Attestation", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0041", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Persistent Memory Exfiltration Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0042", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Persistent Memory Exfiltration Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Lateral Movement", "attack_technique_id": "T1021", "attack_technique_name": "Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1021 Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0043", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Persistent Memory Exfiltration Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Lateral Movement", "attack_technique_id": "T1210", "attack_technique_name": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0044", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Secure Memory Lifecycle Management", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0045", "gaissf_control_id": "D3-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Secure Memory Lifecycle Management", "gaissf_domain": "D3: AGENTIC RISK & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D3-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0046", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Bill Of Materials (Ai Bom) Maintenance", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0047", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Bill Of Materials (Ai Bom) Maintenance", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0048", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Model File & Artifact Scanning", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0049", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Model File & Artifact Scanning", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0050", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Hub & Registry Vetting", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0051", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Hub & Registry Vetting", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0052", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Mcp Server Behavioral Monitoring", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0053", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Mcp Server Behavioral Monitoring", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0054", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Third-Party Ai Api Security Assessment", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0055", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Third-Party Ai Api Security Assessment", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0056", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Shadow Ai Discovery & Governance", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0057", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Shadow Ai Discovery & Governance", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Discovery", "attack_technique_id": "T1049", "attack_technique_name": "System Network Connections Discovery", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1049 System Network Connections Discovery. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0058", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Software Composition Analysis (Sca)", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0059", "gaissf_control_id": "D4-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Software Composition Analysis (Sca)", "gaissf_domain": "D4: SUPPLY CHAIN & THIRD-PARTY AI SECURITY", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D4-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0060", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Harmful Content Blocking", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0061", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Pii Leakage Prevention", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0062", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Copyright Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0063", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Watermarking Robustness", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0064", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Privacy-By-Design Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0065", "gaissf_control_id": "D5-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Privacy-Preserving Ml Validation", "gaissf_domain": "D5: CONTENT SAFETY & OUTPUT INTEGRITY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D5-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0066", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Human-In-The-Loop For High-Risk Actions", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1098", "attack_technique_name": "Account Manipulation", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1098 Account Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0067", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Human-In-The-Loop For High-Risk Actions", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1136", "attack_technique_name": "Create Account", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1136 Create Account. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0068", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Audit Trail Completeness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Discovery", "attack_technique_id": "T1087", "attack_technique_name": "Account Discovery", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1087 Account Discovery. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0069", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Audit Trail Completeness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1070", "attack_technique_name": "Indicator Removal", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1070 Indicator Removal. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0070", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Model Card Completeness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1190", "attack_technique_name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0071", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Model Card Completeness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0072", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Incident Response Readiness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1098", "attack_technique_name": "Account Manipulation", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1098 Account Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0073", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Incident Response Readiness", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "attack_technique_id": "T1136", "attack_technique_name": "Create Account", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1136 Create Account. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0074", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Deprecation & Decommissioning", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1190", "attack_technique_name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0075", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Model Deprecation & Decommissioning", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0076", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Third-Party Ai Vendor Governance", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0077", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Third-Party Ai Vendor Governance", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1584", "attack_technique_name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1584 Compromise Infrastructure. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0078", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Resilience & Business Continuity", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1490", "attack_technique_name": "Inhibit System Recovery", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1490 Inhibit System Recovery. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0079", "gaissf_control_id": "D6-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Resilience & Business Continuity", "gaissf_domain": "D6: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & HUMAN OVERSIGHT", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1529", "attack_technique_name": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D6-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0080", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H01", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai-Generated Phishing Simulation", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1566", "attack_technique_name": "Phishing", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1566 Phishing. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0081", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H01", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai-Generated Phishing Simulation", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0082", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H02", "gaissf_control_title": "Deepfake Detection Training", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "attack_technique_id": "T1129", "attack_technique_name": "Shared Modules", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1129 Shared Modules. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0083", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H02", "gaissf_control_title": "Deepfake Detection Training", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0084", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H03", "gaissf_control_title": "Out-Of-Band Authentication", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Privilege Escalation", "attack_technique_id": "T1484", "attack_technique_name": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0085", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H03", "gaissf_control_title": "Out-Of-Band Authentication", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Credential Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1110", "attack_technique_name": "Brute Force", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1110 Brute Force. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0086", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H04", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Social Engineering Ir", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0087", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H04", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai Social Engineering Ir", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1592", "attack_technique_name": "Gather Victim Host Information", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1592 Gather Victim Host Information. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0088", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H05", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai-Enhanced External Attack Defense", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1133", "attack_technique_name": "External Remote Services", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1133 External Remote Services. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0089", "gaissf_control_id": "D7-CTL-H05", "gaissf_control_title": "Ai-Enhanced External Attack Defense", "gaissf_domain": "D7: HUMAN & SOCIETAL HARMS", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1566", "attack_technique_name": "Phishing", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D7-CTL-H05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1566 Phishing. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0090", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Eu Ai Act Risk Tier Mapping", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0091", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Eu Ai Act Risk Tier Mapping", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1592", "attack_technique_name": "Gather Victim Host Information", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1592 Gather Victim Host Information. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0092", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Iso 42001 Gap Analysis", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0093", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Iso 42001 Gap Analysis", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1592", "attack_technique_name": "Gather Victim Host Information", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1592 Gather Victim Host Information. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0094", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Gpai Technical Documentation Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1596", "attack_technique_name": "Search Open Technical Databases", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1596 Search Open Technical Databases. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0095", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Gpai Technical Documentation Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0096", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Dora Ict Incident Reporting (Financial Sector)", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1657", "attack_technique_name": "Financial Theft", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1657 Financial Theft. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0097", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Dora Ict Incident Reporting (Financial Sector)", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0098", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Nist Sp 800-218A Compliance Check", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "attack_technique_id": "T1587", "attack_technique_name": "Develop Capabilities", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1587 Develop Capabilities. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0099", "gaissf_control_id": "D8-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Nist Sp 800-218A Compliance Check", "gaissf_domain": "D8: REGULATORY ALIGNMENT & COMPLIANCE", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "attack_technique_id": "T1595", "attack_technique_name": "Active Scanning", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D8-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1595 Active Scanning. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0100", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Physical Harm Boundary Enforcement", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0101", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-01", "gaissf_control_title": "Physical Harm Boundary Enforcement", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-01 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0102", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Safe State And Graceful Degradation", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0103", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-02", "gaissf_control_title": "Safe State And Graceful Degradation", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1490", "attack_technique_name": "Inhibit System Recovery", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-02 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1490 Inhibit System Recovery. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0104", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Human Override And Emergency Stop", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0105", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-03", "gaissf_control_title": "Human Override And Emergency Stop", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1190", "attack_technique_name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-03 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0106", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Cyber-Physical Attack Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0107", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-04", "gaissf_control_title": "Cyber-Physical Attack Detection", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1078", "attack_technique_name": "Valid Accounts", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-04 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0108", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Physical Environment Integrity Monitoring", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0109", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-05", "gaissf_control_title": "Physical Environment Integrity Monitoring", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "attack_technique_id": "T1195", "attack_technique_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-05 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1195 Supply Chain Compromise. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0110", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Actuator Command Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "attack_technique_id": "T1052", "attack_technique_name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0111", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-06", "gaissf_control_title": "Actuator Command Verification", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "attack_technique_id": "T1218", "attack_technique_name": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "relationship": "S", "confidence": "Low", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-06 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" }, { "record_id": "GAISSF-CRO-026-MAP-0112", "gaissf_control_id": "D9-CTL-07", "gaissf_control_title": "Physical Incident Evidence Preservation", "gaissf_domain": "D9: PHYSICAL AI SAFETY", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "attack_technique_id": "T1565", "attack_technique_name": "Data Manipulation", "relationship": "P", "confidence": "Medium", "rationale": "GAISSF D9-CTL-07 provides preventive, detective, governance, resilience, or assurance measures materially relevant to adversary behavior described by ATT&CK technique T1565 Data Manipulation. The relationship is defensive and contextual; it does not assert that the technique is eliminated, detected, or tested in a particular environment.", "residual_gap": "Environment-specific threat intelligence, sub-technique/procedure analysis, platform scope, telemetry engineering, detection-strategy/analytic selection, adversary emulation, evidence sufficiency and operating-effectiveness testing remain necessary.", "expected_evidence": "", "gaissf_source": "GAISSF-NOR-004 v1.0", "attack_source": "MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2" } ], "reverse_tactic_coverage": [ { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0043", "attack_tactic": "Reconnaissance", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D2-CTL-04, D3-CTL-05, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H02, D7-CTL-H04, D8-CTL-01, D8-CTL-02, D8-CTL-03, D8-CTL-04, D8-CTL-05", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1592 Gather Victim Host Information; T1595 Active Scanning; T1596 Search Open Technical Databases", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0042", "attack_tactic": "Resource Development", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-07, D6-CTL-06, D8-CTL-05", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0001", "attack_tactic": "Initial Access", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-06, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-03, D2-CTL-05, D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-06, D3-CTL-07, D4-CTL-01, D4-CTL-02, D4-CTL-03, D4-CTL-04, D4-CTL-05, D4-CTL-06, D4-CTL-07, D6-CTL-03, D6-CTL-05, D6-CTL-06, D7-CTL-H01, D7-CTL-H05, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0002", "attack_tactic": "Execution", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D2-CTL-04, D2-CTL-05, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-04, D7-CTL-H02", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1129 Shared Modules; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0003", "attack_tactic": "Persistence", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D1-CTL-01, D1-CTL-02, D1-CTL-03, D1-CTL-04, D1-CTL-05, D1-CTL-07, D1-CTL-08, D1-CTL-09, D6-CTL-01, D6-CTL-04", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136 Create Account; T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0004", "attack_tactic": "Privilege Escalation", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D7-CTL-H03", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0005", "attack_tactic": "Stealth", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D2-CTL-01, D2-CTL-06, D3-CTL-02, D3-CTL-03, D3-CTL-05, D3-CTL-07, D6-CTL-02, D9-CTL-06", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1070 Indicator Removal; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0112", "attack_tactic": "Defense Impairment", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D3-CTL-04", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1553 Subvert Trust Controls", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0006", "attack_tactic": "Credential Access", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D7-CTL-H03", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1110 Brute Force", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0007", "attack_tactic": "Discovery", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D4-CTL-06, D6-CTL-02", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0008", "attack_tactic": "Lateral Movement", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D3-CTL-01, D3-CTL-06", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1021 Remote Services; T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0009", "attack_tactic": "Collection", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D2-CTL-03", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1119 Automated Collection", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0011", "attack_tactic": "Command and Control", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "", "mapped_priority_techniques": "", "coverage_status": "Not Addressed", "confidence": "Not Rated", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0010", "attack_tactic": "Exfiltration", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-03, D9-CTL-04, D9-CTL-05, D9-CTL-06", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "coverage_status": "Partially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." }, { "attack_tactic_id": "TA0040", "attack_tactic": "Impact", "mapped_gaissf_controls": "D2-CTL-02, D5-CTL-01, D5-CTL-02, D5-CTL-03, D5-CTL-04, D5-CTL-05, D5-CTL-06, D6-CTL-07, D8-CTL-04, D9-CTL-01, D9-CTL-02, D9-CTL-07", "mapped_priority_techniques": "T1485 Data Destruction; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot; T1565 Data Manipulation; T1657 Financial Theft", "coverage_status": "Substantially Addressed", "confidence": "Medium-High", "residual_gap": "Priority-set tactic coverage does not establish complete ATT&CK Enterprise technique/sub-technique coverage, procedure coverage, platform-specific detection coverage, validated telemetry, evidence sufficiency or operating effectiveness." } ] }